BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Association of Asset Management Professionals - ECPv6.15.20//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Association of Asset Management Professionals
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es
X-WR-CALDESC:Eventos para Association of Asset Management Professionals
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Bogota
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:-05
DTSTART:20250101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0300
TZOFFSETTO:-0300
TZNAME:-03
DTSTART:20250101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Pacific/Easter
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0600
TZNAME:-06
DTSTART:20250406T030000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0600
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:-05
DTSTART:20250907T040000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0600
TZNAME:-06
DTSTART:20260405T030000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0600
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:-05
DTSTART:20260906T040000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0600
TZNAME:-06
DTSTART:20270404T030000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0600
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:-05
DTSTART:20270905T040000
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:20250330T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:20251026T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:20260329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:20261025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:20270328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:20271031T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20250309T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20251102T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20260308T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20261101T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20270314T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20271107T090000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Bogota:20260211T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Bogota:20260211T160000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260123T164509Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260123T164605Z
UID:45784-1770822000-1770825600@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:Canada AMP Connection Event
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/canada-amp-connection-event/
CATEGORIES:AMP Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/AMP-CANADA-HORIZONTAL-FEB-11.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Bogota:20260304T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Bogota:20260304T153000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260220T145155Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260220T145215Z
UID:46378-1772634600-1772638200@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:Advancing Safety and Productivity with Virtual Reality and Technology
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/advancing-safety-and-productivity-with-virtual-reality-and-technology/
CATEGORIES:AMP Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/AMP-CANADA-HORIZONTAL-MARCH-4.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Bogota:20260316T110000
DTEND;TZID=America/Bogota:20260316T120000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260209T164100Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260209T164152Z
UID:46292-1773658800-1773662400@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:Lubrication: Lifeblood of the Facility
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/lubrication-lifeblood-of-the-facility/
CATEGORIES:AMP Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/AMP-NEW-ENGLAND-HORIZONTAL-MARCH-16.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires:20260409T190000
DTEND;TZID=America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires:20260409T200000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260326T171700Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260406T153518Z
UID:47151-1775761200-1775764800@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:De la puesta en marcha a la operación confiable: aprendizajes en los primeros años de una planta de producción de litio
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/de-la-puesta-en-marcha-a-la-operacion-confiable-aprendizajes-en-los-primeros-anos-de-una-planta-de-produccion-de-litio/
CATEGORIES:AMP Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/AMP-ARGENTINA-HORIZONTAL-04-09.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Pacific/Easter:20260410T150000
DTEND;TZID=Pacific/Easter:20260410T160000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260327T164908Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260406T153607Z
UID:47172-1775833200-1775836800@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:Gestión del Conocimiento con la Inteligencia Artificial (IA)
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/gestion-del-conocimiento-con-la-inteligencia-artificial-ia/
CATEGORIES:WIRAM Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/WIRAM-latam-04-10-HORIZONTAL.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260415T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260415T110000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260403T165618Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260410T135219Z
UID:47371-1776247200-1776250800@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:Building on the Past\, Leading the Future: A Leadership Journey at Tata Steel
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/building-on-the-past-leading-the-future-a-leadership-journey-at-tata-steel/
CATEGORIES:WIRAM Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/WIRAM-EUROPE-APRIL-15-HORIZONTAL-2.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Bogota:20260507T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Bogota:20260507T233000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260303T204824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260327T165612Z
UID:46602-1778148000-1778196600@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:Certified Reliability Leader® Reconnect 2026
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/certified-reliability-leader-reconnect-2026/
CATEGORIES:AMP Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CRL-RECONNECT-HORIZONTAL-1.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260519T124000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260519T134000
DTSTAMP:20260425T055628
CREATED:20260414T165723Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T172052Z
UID:47646-1779194400-1779198000@assetmanagementprofessionals.org
SUMMARY:WIRAM Panel at TRC 2026: How People and Culture Determine Organizational Success
DESCRIPTION:AM Downtime Newsletter Q4 2025				\n				\n					By Thomas Peyton				\n				\n									This newsletter communicates high-cost/high-impact equipment failures and shares details on causes and countermeasures implemented fleet-wide. 								\n				\n									EventAssetFailure DescriptionApproximate Total Cost (OOS + M&R)STCKY Ranking#1Dredge 58Walking Spud Failure     $600K – $650K     4     #2Dodge IslandClutch Failure (Main ENG/Propulsion)     $300K – $350K     4     #3AlaskaMain Generator Failure     $1.2M – $1.3M     5   								\n				\n					Detailed Event Reports				\n				\n					Event 1: Dredge 58 Walking Spud Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: A crack developed around the circumference of the port breast spud\, causing approximately 35′ of the lower section to break off and fall to the seabed. What Caused It: A combination of age\, fatigue\, and potentially poor initial welds. What Resolved It: Divers rigged the GL 58 to the broken spud section and it was hoisted from the seabed and placed on the deck of the GL 58.The GL 58 was brought into the dock where the remaining top section of spud was lifted from the spud well and the top and bottom sections were placed ashore.The pieces were set up on cribbing to allow for proper alignment and welding. A small\, damaged section of the spud was cut away to present good steel and the two sections were rewelded. The remaining butt welds were inspected with shear wave and numerous areas of weld were gouged and re-welded. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The rest of the clamshell spuds are watertight and capable of being air tested to inspect for cracks. The GL 58 spud is not watertight so an air test is not possible\, a complete NDT inspection will be added to the 5 year dry dock specification. An engineering smart sheet has been entered to evaluate the strength of this spud as the thickness is constant over the length of the spud while other typical spuds in our fleet have a thicker section towards the middle of the spud. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 2: Dodge Island Clutch Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: Port main engine ahead clutch caught fire due to the bladder not inflating to full pressure. Crew hit the emergency stop and extinguished fire with an engine room garden hose. Worth Noting\, while making repairs a crew member sustained a head injury requiring staples\, recordable injury investigated in separate MCIA. What Caused it: Removed the clutch pneumatic controls shuttle valve to investigate and found the piston was damaged. The root cause was found to be the clutch pneumatic control system failure. Found the shuttle valve was not sealing completely when going ahead. Thus causing an intermittent issue where the clutch would not come up to pressure and cause it to slip. The slip created friction and heat which led to the fire.  What Resolved it: Replaced the clutch\, control panel and the shuttle valve piston with new and changed all seal rings on the ahead side of the shuttle. We also replaced the rotary air seal with new. What is Being Done to Prevent it: The clutch controls are 1970s technology and still in use today on Dodge and Padre. Historically the system has proven reliable over time due to simplicity. But age of vessel\, qualified technicians to service\, and parts availability has made upkeep maintenance challenging. Fatigue and wear type failures are more common now. Also it was found the Dodge Island PM standard job for clutch inspections did not exist like it had for the Padre. Thus no routine inspection jobs had ever populated for the Dodges M/E clucthes. Since this finding\, it has been created like Padre and will auto populate moving forward. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Event 3: Alaska Main Generator Failure				\n				\n									What Happened: On December 8th the Alaska’s main generator engine experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the #15 cylinder and connecting rod were ejected through the lower crankcase access door\, resulting in immediate engine shutdown and significant internal damage. Oil was released throughout the engine room and contaminated nearby equipment\, including the Cutter Motor DC generator. Further inspection revealed additional internal damage\, including a broken and separated #7 cylinder connecting rod\, a cracked and deflected #15 access way on block. As designed\, the crankcase pressure shutdown alarm activated preventing further damage and surrounding equipment. No personnel were present in the immediate area at the time of the failure and resulted in no injuries (Major Near Miss) What Caused it: Preliminary findings are an internal failure of the #15 power assembly possibly from a fractured piston ring leading to cylinder damage and a spike in crankcase pressure as indicated on alarm. This resulted with the connecting rod and cylinder breaking free and eject through the lower access door\, creating secondary failures. The engine had approximately 26\,000 hours of operation\, nearing its required OEM 30\,000-hour overhaul interval due in 2026. Should be noted all OEM Standard Jobs were performed as specified and within all required intervals. What Resolved it: The engine and MG set were locked out and tagged out and area was secured\, and initial investigation commenced alongside cleanup. Repairs included conducting a thorough inspection of all critical EMD components\, repairing/polishing the damaged crankshaft to address defects\, replacing the hand hole and safety covers\, replacing the damaged power assemblies and flushing the engine to remove debris and contaminants introduced during the failure and repair process. We were fortunate the crankshaft was repairable. What is Being Done to Prevent it: MSI is attempting to develop a comprehensive root cause analysis\, but is difficult based on the extent of damage to the failed parts. Any conclusive results will be shared and evaluated for corrective actions to prevent recurrence. We plan to also install a protective steel plate in between the engine and electrical equipment to mitigate collateral damage in case of future failures. 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q4 (as of 1/23/26)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					Fleet RAM Leading Indicators Q3 (as of 9/30/25)				\n				\n																														\n				\n																														\n				\n					SLETTER Q4 | 2025 6\n2025 TRIR & MMIR Stats (Total Year)				\n				\n									TRIR: This is a measure of time spent maintaining and repairing our vessels against production HRS. MMIR: This is a measure of Major Maintenance and repair events (>24 HRS) against production HRS. DMDM- Daily Mechanical Delay Metric: The number of hours down per day on Revenue for a Mechanical Delay. Mechanical Delay Hours divided by Revenue Days. GOAL TRIR 5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′  MMIR 2.5% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n									GOAL DMDM 2% Reduction from 5-Year Average 20′-24′ 								\n				\n																														\n				\n					About the Author				\n					\n				\n		\n					\n		\n				\n																														\n				\n		\n				\n									Thomas Peyton: With nearly two decades of fleet maintenance expertise\, Thomas specializes in high-level reliability strategies for the maritime sector. His diverse background includes significant roles at General Dynamics and Kirby Corp\, providing him with a unique perspective on both naval and commercial operations. Now a leader in the US Dredging industry\, Thomas is a former a Certified Maintenance Manager®.
URL:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/es/event/wiram-panel-at-trc-2026-how-people-and-culture-determine-organizational-success/
LOCATION:South San Francisco Conference Center\, San Francisco\, United States
CATEGORIES:WIRAM Chapters
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://assetmanagementprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/WIRAM-PANEL.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR